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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE ~I. WHITELEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN De VRIES, BARBARA De-




M. L. EWELL, doing business as 
Ewell Plumbing and Heating, 
Defendamt and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7314 
Respondent agrees with most of what is stated as 
the facts of this matter by ap·pellant in his brief. How-
ever, there are certain matters which should be clarified. 
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On the lOth of March, 1947, respondent loaned $4,-
000.00 to John DeVries and Barbara DeVries on a 
promissory note secured by mortgage, said loan to bear 
interest at the rate of 6!% per annum and payable at 
the rate of $50.00 per month; thereafter, on April 16, 
1947, respondent loaned to DeVries $1,000.00 on a prom-
issory note secured by a mortgage on the said premises. 
The original loans were made to enable the DeVries to 
build a tourist court on their property at 4214 :South 
State Street. Construction was commenced. Among 
those working on the property was one M. L. Ewell, 
the appellant, who did the plumbing work. He com-
menced working on the premises about the 1st of July, 
1947 and finished his work on August 15, 1947. After 
he had agreed to do the plumbing work on the tourist 
motel and had commenced work, it became necessary 
for DeVries to get additional financing. Therefore, on 
July 31st, DeVries borrowed an additional $600.00 from 
respondent. To secure said loan DeVries gave respond-
ent a warranty deed (Tr. 124, 125, 126). It was to be 
repaid in sixty days. The $600.00 was paid to appellant 
and thereafter appellant finished the plumbing work 
he had undertaken. 
The answer and counterclaim of appellant deny the 
execution of the mortgages, admit the recording of 
them, and deny generally, for lack of information, the 
allegations of plaintiff's complaint. However, there was 
no controversy over the execution of the mortgages or 
the warranty deed. The only issue made by the plead-
ings over which there was any controversy was whether 
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or not the receipt by respondent of the \varranty deed, 
the subject of his third cause of action, caused a merger 
of his t\vo mortgages, effectively destroying the prior 
clai1ns against the property. 
'The appellant alleges in paragraph 2 of the affir-
mative defense portion of his ans\ver, "That at the in-
stance and request of the defendants John De V 11ies arnd 
Barbara De V ri.es defendant performed labor and fur-
nished materials on the property described in said com-
plaint * * *" 
The fifth paragraph of said answer sets up the 
theory upon \vhich this case was tried before the trial 
court~ said paragraph 5 reading as follows (Tr. 28): 
'' 5. That by reason of the relinquishment of 
said mortgage by reason of the warranty deed 
set out above the lien of this defendant is prior 
and paramount to the mortgaged indebtedness 
alleged in plaintiff's First Cause Of Action." 
There are no pleadings which make an issue of the 
fact of appellant's reliance on respondent. 
The court's decree sets down the priority of the 
claims of respondent and appellant. The sheriff's costs 
\Vere given first priority; respondent's $4,000.00 mort-
gage, the interest thereon and attorneys' fees applying 
thereto, were placed second; his $1,000.00 mortgage, the 
interest thereon and the attorneys' fees applicable there-
to, were. placed third, then the court decreed that if 
there were any proceeds remaining the sheriff should 
deposit in court the sum of $1, 514.75, together with in-
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terest thereon from the 1st day of July, 1947, said 
amount being the claimed debt for which appellant had 
a mechanic's lien. 
The loan which was secured by the warranty deed 
was given fifth place in priority by the court's decree. 
The theory of defense made by the pleadings was 
that the receipt by respondent of the warranty deed 
merged all of his interest in the DeVries' property and 
therefore the mechanic's lien, which was filed by appel-
lant on October 3, 1947, taking priority as of July 1, 
1947, came ahead of respondent's mortgage of March 
lOth and his mortgage of April 15, 1947. It was only 
after the finding of the court that said warranty deed 
did not merge the two prior mortgages that appellant 
advanced his theory of reliance upon respondent as the 
party responsible for all the building on the motel at 
4214 South State Street. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
NEITHER THE PLEADINGS NOR THE EVIDENCE 
MAKE ANY ISSUE ON APPELLANT'S RELIANCE UPON 
RESPONDENT AS HIS DEBTOR. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT MAY NOT SEEK REVIEW O·N A DE-
FENSE NOT PRESENT'ED BY THE PLEADINGS OR EVI-
DENCE IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
POINT III. 
THE DECREE OF THE COURT IS SUPPO·RTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL AND UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE. 
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ARGUI\IENT 
POIN'T I . 
. NEITHER THE PLEADINGS NOR THE EVIDENCE 
1\IAKE ANY ISSUE ON APPELLANT'S RELIANCE UPON 
RESPONDENT AS HIS DEBTOR. 
Appellant's argument under his first subheading is 
based completely upon his reliance theory. The cases 
'vhich he cites in support of said argument are all cases 
"\vhere the mortgagees have, by their conduct, caused a 
mechanic or other person doing work on mortgaged 
premises to believe that the mortgagee was the owner 
and responsible person to whom they could look for the 
payment of any obligation against the premises. In the 
case at bar no such facts exist. Appellant's answer is 
completely inconsistent with any such theory. It states 
specifically that the services and materials furnished 
by appellant were furnished at the "instance and re-
quest of the defendants John De Vries and Barbara 
DeVries.'' 
The work which appellant did was contracted and 
commenced pTior to the date of the $600.00 loan. The 
record is clear that Ewell did not even know who appel-
lant was at the time he contracted to do the plumbing 
work for DeVries (Tr. 116, 117). It is also clear that 
respondent, Whiteley, did not know who Ewell was (Tr. 
126). The only persons Ewell ever saw were DeVries 
and Gaddis. Gaddis was the agent of Whiteley but for 
a very limited purpose, to loan Whiteley's money and, 
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at the same time he was the agent of DeVries in securing 
a loan for him. There is no evidence whatsoever of any 
authority on the part of Gaddis to -contract with mechan-
ies or workmen for work on property owned by DeVries. 
Ewell frankly stated that he dealt only with DeVries 
and the money which he received was from D,eVries. 
All of the parties involved, Whiteley, Ewell, Gaddis 
and DeVries looked upon and considered DeVries to be 
the owner of the motel when the loan of $600.00 was 
made. DeVries exercised the control of the details of 
the work and construction and acted at all times as the 
owner. 
POIN'T II. 
APPELLANT MAY NOT SEEK REVIEW ON A DE-
FENSE NOT PRESENTED BY THE PLEADINGS OR EVI-
DENCE IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
The defense which appellant asserts on appea1 
seems to be that he relied on respondent, Whiteley, in 
doing his work. That defense was not pleaded and no 
issue on it ever made in the trial court. 
The law of this state. is that if there is any reason 
why defendant should prevail it is his duty to plead it 
as a defense. Not having done so he cannot complain on 
appeal.Mills v. Gr1ay, 50 Utah 224, 167 P. 358; Chipmarn 
v. Ame.rica;n F1ork City, 54 Utah ·93, 179 P. 742. 
The cases are numerous that the type of defense 
which appellant now asserts must be pleaded and relied 
upon in his action in the trial court before he can raise 
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the matter in the appellate court. See Dolimsky v. Wil-
ll~a.n1s, 56 Utah 186, 189 P. 873. 
It would be a strange situation if an appellant was 
allo,ved to urge upon this court a defense and theory 
\Yhich he did not plead and which was inconsistent with 
the allegations of his complaint. To allow it would give 
such an appellant an unconscionable advantage over 
both respondent and the trial court. Fisher v. Bank of 
Spa.nish F~oTk, 93 Utah 514, 74 P. (2d) 659; Ob·radovich 
v. Walker Bros. Bank, 86 Utah 587, 16 P. (2d) 212. 
POINT III. 
THE DECREE OF THE COURT IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL AND UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE. 
Under Point II, appellant argues that the trial 
court erred in not sustaining defendant's objections and 
motion to strike the testimony of witness Gaddis. Ap-
pellant quotes only a part of the testimony concerning 
the nature of the warranty deed. Gaddis, after the 
testimony to which appellant objected, testified fully 
concerning what he remembered of the transaction in-
volving the warranty deed. During the cross-examina-
tion the following pertinent information was elicited 
('Tr. 96) : 
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"Q For the purpose of negotiating this 
loan~ 
''A Mr. Whi te1ey was going to lend six 
hundred dollars to mortgage on the property. 
"Q · What did he say~ 
''A He would lend six hundred dollars pro-
vided they would give him a Vv arrenty Deed to 
the property instead of a third mortgage.'' 
And at a still later time the following question and 
answer was elicited by appellant's -counsel (Tr. 100,101): 
"Q What did you say to Mr. DeVries~ 
"A What did I -say to ~1r. De Vries~ 
"Q y es. 
"A I said, 'Mr. Whiteley demands a War-
ranty Deed to the property if he gives you this 
third loan of six hundred dollars.' He wants 
this Warranty Deed to the property, which De-
Vries and his wife agreed to.'' 
And then on redirect examination the following inter-
change occurred ( Tr. 103) : 
"Q You were the agent for Mr. Whiteley 
and what did you understand this instrument to 
be~" 
* :t * * * 
''A Security for the six hundred dollar 
loan.'' 
In the review by this court of an equity case wherein 
the judge sat without a jury, the court will 'P~resume 
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that the trial court disregarded incompetent, immaterial 
or valueless evidence. The court in effect gives a trial 
de novo on the record made in the trial court. In this 
trial de novo the judgment will be reversed only if 
after excluding improper evidence, the judgm·ent of 
the trial court does not then have support in the evi-
dence. Federal Land Bank of Berkley v. Salt Lake Val-
ley Sa;nd & Gra.v:el Co., 96 Utah 359, 85 P. (2d) 791; 
Lipscomb v. Exchange Nation1al Bank of Spokarne, 80 
Wash. 296, 141 P. 686. 
Whiteley himself testified clearly and succinctly 
concerning the nature of the transaction. The record is 
replete ·w·ith statements to the effect that the taking of 
this warrenty deed was merely to secure an additional 
loan of $600.00 and that it was not intended by either 
the De Vries or respondent to merge and destroy the 
rights which respondent had under his two earlier mort-
gages. 
The law of this state is clear that where a mortgage 
incumbrancer becomes the owner of the legal title J 
the equity of redemption, a merger will not be held to 
take place, if it be app-arent that it was not the intention 
of the mortgagee, or if, in the absence of any intention, 
-the merger would be against his manifest interest. 
Ch(J;U.Sse v. B:ank of Garlwnd, 71 Utah 586, 268 P. 781; 
O'Reilly v. McLeam, 84 Utah 551, 37 P. (2d) 770. 
Under the facts of the present case the manifest 
interest of respondent Whiteley are against merger, it 
being abundantly clear that if merger occurred the pri-
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ority date of Whiteley's interest would be July 31, 
1948. Not only would Ewell's mechanic's lien come 
ahead of the two mortgages which respondent had upon 
the premises, but the mechanic's lien of one Harry L. 
Barnum would be prior. Whiteley specifically stated 
his intentions (Tr. 125, 12.6) : 
''A W eli, he said to me-l am taking both 
parts-Mr. DeVries told me this condition that 
I am repeating, that the plu1nber \vouldn't go 
any further until he had $600 more, and, if he 
had $600 more, he could get opened, and that we 
-if I would let him have another $600, he'd get 
open there in sixty days; he would return the 
$600 to me, and that, for this $600, he would give 
me a deed to the property for sixty days, guaran-
teeing to pick up the $600 that I was to let him 
have within sixty days, and that's how this-
" Q That instrument then that he gave 
you-
'' A This is what was given me for the secur-
ity for my $600. 
''Q Now, did Mr. DeVries or his wife ever 
pick this deed up or pay you the $600~ 
''A Never did, no. 
'' Q Never received any money on account 
of this loan of $600 ~ 
"A I received a $50 interest payment. 
'' Q 'That is all you have ever received~ 
"A That is all I have ever received. 
'' Q This proposition, this security arrange-
men, was Mr. DeVries' suggestions, was it, Mr. 
Whiteley, as you have related here~ 
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''A No, I think that was Mr. Gaddis' idea 
to take-he said, 'We'll take a deed to this prop-
erty from you if Mr. Whiteley will let you have 
the $600, and at the end of sixty days, if you pick 
up the $600, you can have the deed back and then 
the t":o first and second mortgages will ride.''' 
In view of the testimony both the Chau.sse and O'Reilly 
Cases are controlling and no merger occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the lower court's judgment that 
the liens created by respondent's two mortgages did 
not merge with the warranty deed is correct and there-
fore the decree of the court awarding respondent pri-
ority as to his first two mortgages over ap·pellant's lien 
is a correct and lawful judgment. 
Respectfully subm/i)tt ed, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
BLACK & RO·BERTS, 
Dwight L. King 
.Attorneys fO!r Respo%den"b 
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